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Trust and its Implications for Economic Activity, 
Welfare and Globalisation 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
According to The Macquarie Dictionary, the word ‘trust’ has more than 20 
interpretations in English. Therefore, it is important to specify the way in which the 
word is being used in any discourses about managerial and economic issues. In what 
respect and to what extent are economic agents to be trusted in their dealings with 
others. When economic agents are untrustworthy, this adds to economic transaction 
costs, reduces the level of economic activity and the achievable level of economic 
welfare as well as potential gains from growing globalisation. Several adverse 
economic consequences of lack of business trust are explored along with their 
consequences for the process of globalisation. Business co-operation and alliances can 
be important for gaining access to international markets, particularly for small and 
medium-sized firms. Middle traders can play an important role through their 
cooperation with smaller producers in enabling their products to be exported. 
However, suppliers at the bottom of the exchange chain tend to become locked into 
such cooperative arrangements. This can result in their economic exploitation and 
growing mistrust of such arrangements. Furthermore, once exploitation by a few 
middlemen occurs, competitors may be forced to follow their practice. Hence, the bad 
middlemen drive out the good and cooperative institutional arrangements can be 
expected to collapse with adverse impacts on economic activity, welfare and exports. 
Trust is also important in relation to most contracts and the sale of goods. As pointed 
out by Williamson, most contracts are incomplete and rely for their full execution on 
some degree of trust or unspecified expectations. There ‘reasonable’ expectations may 
vary from country to country and this creates a challenge for global transactions. 
Furthermore, trust problems are important in relation to principal-agent contracts 
which are invariably incomplete. Global operations of businesses can provide extra 
scope for agents to engage in deviant behaviour. Sale of goods can also involve 
distrust. Scope for fraud and misrepresentation of goods can increase when there is 
considerable distance between the traders as is often the case in global exchanges. 
This limits the incentive for trade and can result in market failure and a loss of 
economic welfare. It reduces the potential extent of and benefits from economic 
globalisation. Measures that can or have been adopted to reduce these problems are 
outlined. 
 
Trust and its Implications for Economic Activity, 
Welfare and Globalisation 
1. Introduction 
In a society in which individuals can be trusted, economic activity will be a greater 
and economic welfare higher than in a society in which trustworthiness is lacking. 
Furthermore, trustworthiness will encourage economic exchange even when buyers 
and sellers are located at considerable distances from one another. The presence of 
trust is, therefore, favourable to the process of economic globalisation. However, the 
word ‘trust’ (which is Scandinavian in origin) has more than twenty meanings in 
English (Delbridge, 1981, p.1855). Trustworthiness is used here to mean that one can 
rely on the integrity of a person (or legal entity) to honour commitments, including 
customary expectations which accompany such commitments. Similar expectations 
apply in relation to the sale of goods, for example, one trusts that a good is as 
represented by the seller and is able to fulfil the purpose for which it is normally 
intended. Furthermore, when individuals are placed in different social roles in society, 
it is important that they can be trusted to carry out the functions that are normally 
assigned to these roles. In the case of business managers of public companies, for 
instance, it is important that they pursue the basic objectives of their shareholders 
which in many cases is to maximize the market value of their shares. 
Business cooperation and alliances can be important means for firms to extend their 
access to markets, including international markets. This is particularly so for small 
and medium-sized firms. They often have to cooperate with larger firms to increase 
their market access. Trust is a significant influence on whether such alliances form 
and whether they last. Trust is also important in relation to the fulfilment of business 
contracts and for the sale of goods. These aspects are explored in this article in turn 
and their implications for economic globalisation are examined. 
2. Business Cooperation and Trust 
There is often scope for businesses to make mutual economic gains by cooperating or 
forming alliance (Tisdell, 1996, Ch. 13; Tisdell, 2007). For instance, it is not 
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uncommon for a larger business to enter into cooperative supply arrangements with 
smaller enterprises. If the large enterprise is a manufacturer the small and medium-
sized firms co-operating with it may supply the larger enterprise with components. In 
return for maintaining a particular quality and regular supply of components, the 
larger firm may assure its cooperating smaller firms of their market and provide them 
with technological knowledge. Or the smaller firms may supply a larger cooperating 
firm with finished products which it retails as, for example, has been the practice of 
Marks and Spencer (Tse, 1985; Tisdell, 1996, Ch.13) or the larger firm may act as a 
middleman in the sale of products produced and supplied by the small firms they 
cooperate with. 
The vertical product chain in the latter case is one in which the large firm in the chain 
cooperates with several small and medium-sized firms to supply it with products 
which it then retails to end purchasers. This is illustrated in Figure 1. However, there 
can be many more steps in this chain. For example, the large firm (or firms) in the 
chain may sell to intermediate buyers or middlemen who in turn sell to retailers. 
 
Supplies from 
small or medium 
enterprises 
 
Large retail firm 
involved in 
cooperation 
 
 
Final purchasers 
 
Figure 1:  A simple cooperative vertical supply chain involving several small or 
medium-sized enterprises and a large retailing firm. 
What is the likely economic advantage of the type of relationship illustrated in Figure 
1? One advantage from the point of view of final purchasers is that the large firm in 
the chain is able to reduce their market transaction costs by ensuring that the products 
supplied reach acceptable quality standards. This may be reinforced by a promise to 
buyers from the retailer to refund their purchase price if they are not fully satisfied 
with the goods purchases. In most cases, it is likely to be valuable to the retailer to 
maintain its reputation and goodwill. 
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The larger firm in the chain is likely to find it more economical to check the quality of 
the products supplied than final purchasers and is able to impose a higher penalty on 
suppliers who do not meet agreed standards in their supplies, such as by no longer 
purchasing from them. As part of its cooperative agreement, the larger firm in the 
chain may provide smaller suppliers with credit, technical knowledge and market 
information. Normally, the main advantage to the smaller firm of cooperating is an 
assurance of the market for its products. 
Nevertheless, while such cooperative arrangements can be mutually advantageous to 
business firms, whether or not such alliances are formed and last depends on trust. To 
some extent, businesses become locked into their cooperative arrangements. However, 
it is the small and medium-sized enterprises in the chain which are at most risk from 
‘lock-in’. As a result of the cooperative arrangement, SMEs (small and medium 
enterprises) may fail to develop alternative markets or only do so to a limited extent. 
They are, therefore, vulnerable to exploitation by the larger firm in the chain. 
Furthermore, if the larger firm has specific requirements for the products supplied to 
it, small firms may have to adjust their machinery or production methods to satisfy 
these requirements. This adds to their lock-in because if the cooperation fails, they 
incur sunk costs due to the specificity of these items. Therefore, it is important for a 
small firm to be sure that a large firm with which it cooperates can be trusted to act 
according to the spirit of their agreement. 
Often a larger firm in the type of chain illustrated by Figure 1 has the choice of 
several small and medium-sized firms from which it can source supplies. This 
provides scope for unscrupulous middle traders to exploit primary suppliers by 
enticing some of the primary suppliers into cooperative arrangements and 
subsequently reducing their profit margins. Once these cooperative arrangements 
break down, other ‘gullible’ primary suppliers may be sought and the process may 
continue. The problem is that this behaviour by unscrupulous traders puts economic 
pressure on trustworthy secondary traders who have entered into cooperative 
arrangements with primary suppliers. The unscrupulous traders are able to undercut 
the prices of the scrupulous in their trading. Consequently, those firms that are 
normally trustworthy may also be forced to act in an unscrupulous way in order to 
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survive. Once these practices become widespread, small and medium-sized firms will 
shy away from cooperative trading agreements. Consequently, unscrupulous traders 
will drive out the scrupulous and interfirm trading cooperation or alliances will no 
longer occur. As a result of this institutional collapse, there is an economic loss; 
traders are unable to make mutually advantageous trading arrangements involving 
cooperation and consumers may have less quality assurance. This case has parallels 
the type of situation analysed by Akerlof (1970). 
In cases where cooperative trading arrangements improve the access of a national 
industry to international markets, the formation and survival of co-operative business 
trading arrangements are important if businesses are to take advantage of greater 
trading opportunities made possible by growing economic globalisation. Furthermore, 
business cooperation can be important in enabling firms to withstand growing 
incursions into their home or national market as economic globalisation gathers 
momentum (Tisdell, 2007). 
There are, of course, many other ways in which business enterprises can cooperate. 
They may for example, enter into joint ventures and into franchise agreements. 
Whether or not such alliances will eventuate and how durable they prove to be will 
depend on the trustworthiness displayed by the business partners. In such cooperative 
arrangements, it may, as pointed out by Tisdell (1966, Ch.12), pay  for dominant 
partners or those with the greatest threat power to be generous to the weaker partners 
(there with less threat power) since this may provide an incentive for superior 
performance by the weaker partners. This is because the total benefits from 
cooperation are unlikely to be a fixed pie. The size of the pie is likely to depend on 
how those benefits are shared between partners. The solution of von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1944) to cooperative games, and that of Nash (1950) to such games 
(based on the relative threat power of the players) assumes the division of a fixed 
cooperative pie of gains.  
While it is recognized in the relevant literature that trust is a major factor influencing 
the make-or-buy discussion of enterprises, (because increased business trust reduces 
market transaction costs and increases the likelihood of a firm buying more of its 
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inputs rather than making them itself thereby increasing economic specialisation by 
businesses), there is usually no in depth discussion of what leads to the development 
and maintenance of business trust. There appears also to be no quantitative estimate of 
the amount by which increasing trust between cooperating firms can reduce market 
transaction costs. However, an empirical study by Latif Adam (2007) of producers in 
the garment industry in Indonesia identified factors that were important in the 
development and maintenance of business trust between enterprises and provided 
rankings of the types of economic benefits that cooperating firms said they obtained 
from their interfirm cooperation. 
3. Contracts, Principal-Agent Issues and Trust 
As Willliamson (1975) points out, most contracts or agreements are incomplete. 
Those entering into such contracts trust that the partners will carry out their formal 
obligations as specified in the contract or agreement as well as their expectations 
about loosely specified conditions or customary performance associated with such 
contracts. Therefore, a major element of trust is involved. Although a party to a 
contract is likely to have legal recourse for its non-fulfilment, this is in most cases 
inadequate consolation for the non-fulfilment of a contract. The extent of damages to 
be paid for non-fulfilment when legal action is taken is uncertain, especially as far as 
‘implied’ conditions of the contract are concerned. Consequently, legal action is often 
only taken as a last resort. 
Where there is a widespread expectation that partners to a contract are not likely to 
perform the agreement faithfully in accordance either with the conditions specified or 
its spirit, this can be expected to reduce the extent of economic exchange or add to the 
costs of monitoring potential parties to contracts and the execution of contracts. 
Consequently, lack of trust then adds to the cost of economic activity and adds to the 
transaction costs involved in such activity. As a result, potential economic well-being 
is less than it would otherwise be.  
The problem of incomplete contracts is particularly acute in relation to agents and in 
relation to employees. This is because it is often difficult to monitor their behaviour, 
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that is, for the principal to monitor and control the behaviour of his/her agent and for 
an employer to regulate the behaviour of an employee. The monitoring costs are high. 
Therefore, the principal or employer has to be able to trust the agent or employer to 
carry out his/her duties faithfully. Considerable time may, therefore, be spent in 
selecting an agent or an employee, trying not only to assess their competence but how 
trustworthy they are likely to be in carrying out their duties. Once again, lack of 
trustworthiness can be expected to reduce reliance on agents and to decrease 
employment prospects. It can also result in increased monitoring by the principal or 
employee, all of which adds to transaction costs. A reduction in the amount of 
economic transactions and an increase in transaction costs reduces the attainable level 
of economic welfare in society. 
4. Sale of Goods and Trust 
Economists have given considerable attention to mistrust as a source of market failure 
in the sale of goods (Akerlof, 1970; Varian, 1987, Ch. 35; Tisdell and Hartley, 2008, 
Ch.5). The problem arises because there is often asymmetry of information between 
buyers and sellers involved in the exchange of goods. In particular, consumers 
(especially in the sale of complex commodities or the provision of services relying on 
specialized knowledge, such as the servicing of motor vehicles) are likely to be less 
knowledgeable about the qualities of the good or service being sold than the seller. 
This provides scope for cheating by sellers. If such cheating becomes widespread, this 
can lead to the collapse of the market for commodities of superior quality even though 
they are in demand. This is because buyers come to believe that there is a high 
probability that goods which are represented as being of superior quality are in fact 
defective or of inferior quality. Consequently, the whole market for the product 
concerned may collapse or only inferior products will be traded and priced 
accordingly. In essence the bad products drive out the good ones. Both suppliers of 
superior products and consumers who wish to purchase superior products suffer an 
economic loss because a sufficiently large number of sellers cannot be trusted. 
Another possibility in this situation is that consumers incur search and monitoring 
costs to distinguish between superior and inferior products. For example, in the case 
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of a used car sale, they may have the vehicle checked by an independent expert. This 
all adds to transaction costs and reduces economic welfare. Increased transaction costs 
reduce the size of the market and in normal circumstances reduce the economic 
benefits available to consumers (that is consumers’ surplus) and also lowers the 
economic gains of producers, that is producers’ surplus.  
This is illustrated in Figure 2. In this case, it is assumed that consumers cannot trust 
sellers and as a result their market transaction costs are higher than they otherwise 
should be. For example, suppose that if sellers are completely trustworthy, the market 
demand for product X is as indicated by line AD. Market equilibrium would then 
correspond to E1 if the line GS is the industry’s supply curve. But if buyers find that 
they cannot trust sellers, they may incur market transaction costs equal to AB on each 
unit of the product purchased. When this is taken into account, the market demand for 
product X will fall from AD to BD' and a new market equilibrium will be established 
at E2. As a result, the quantity traded of X falls from X2 to X1 and its equilibrium price 
falls from OC to OF. There is a decrease in both consumers’ surplus and producers’ 
surplus. Consumers’ surplus falls from an amount equivalent to the area of triangle 
ACE1 to an amount equal to the area of triangle BFE2. Producers’ surplus declines 
from an amount equal to the area of triangle CGE1 to an amount equivalent to the area 
of triangle FGE2. It can be shown that the combined loss in economic welfare of 
buyers and sellers due to sellers being untrustworthy is equivalent to the area of the 
trapezium ABE2E1. If in addition, the seller cannot trust buyers (for example to pay 
their bills or do so promptly if the good is sold or credit), this will add to the market 
transaction cost of sellers. This would result in the supply curve of the industry being 
higher than GS. This will further reduce the economic benefits obtained by both 
buyers and sellers of X and will reduce the quantity traded of the product. The 
economic impact of supply-side market transaction costs are illustrated in Tisdell 
1966 (Ch. 16). 
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 Figure 2: Mistrust of either buyers or sellers in the sale of goods reduces the size of 
the market and usually damages both buyers and sellers. This diagram 
illustrates the economic consequences of buyers mistrusting sellers. A 
similar situation also occurs when buyers cannot be trusted. 
Thus, it is clear that the market system operates most economically or efficiently 
when traders can all be trusted. A deterioration in trust amongst traders reduces 
economic benefits from economic activity and exchange. In the normal situation both 
buyers and sellers have reduced economic benefits from trading when trading parties 
are not to be trusted. In the long run, all lose if traders become unreliable in making 
their transactions. 
5. Trust as an Element in the Facilitation of Economic Globalisation 
Reductions in man-made barriers to international trade and exchange (such as reduced 
levels of tariffs on imported goods, the abolition of trade quotas, fewer restrictions on 
foreign investment and fewer qualitative restrictions on imported commodities for 
example, an easing of phytosanitory restrictions, as well as favourable technological 
change which for example, lowers transport and communication costs) are important 
factors that have stimulated the rapid rate of growth of economic globalisation in 
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recent decades (Tisdell and Sen, 2004; Tisdell, 2005). However, the extent to which 
the business community (and the wider economic community) is able to take 
advantage of the extra trading opportunities opened up by growing globalisation and 
withstand the new economic challenges it poses depends on their trust in making 
economic deals both internationally and locally. 
International trade and exchange do not occur in a social vacuum. They can hardly 
take place in the absence of trust between the parties involved. Trust has an important 
direct influence on the level of international economic activities and can be important 
indirectly in making local or national producers who form alliances or cooperative 
arrangement to be more competitive internationally. This may occur either because 
business cooperation lowers their costs of supply, improves the quality of their 
products or more effectively signals the quality of their products to buyers than 
otherwise. For example, a large secondary supplier acting as a middleman for smaller 
primary supplier may be able to signal effectively the quality of their products and 
reduce the market transaction costs which they would otherwise have if trading 
internationally. Indeed, the problem of gaining access to international markets 
encountered by small producers may be so acute that they may fail to trade 
internationally in the absence of cooperative business arrangements. 
Cole (1988) and Sandee and van Diermen (2004) provide specific examples of how 
small Indonesian manufacturers have as a result of cooperation with buyers cum 
consultants from developed countries been able to access markets in developed 
countries. They respectively provide a detailed account of this for the export of 
garments from Bali and for Indonesia’s exports of furniture. They emphasize that this 
business cooperation has been successful because it has been profitable for all the 
parties involved (Adam and Tisdell, 2008). 
Trust proves to be important in influencing the extent of international trade, exchange 
and investment through its influences on the occurrence of business cooperation and 
the formation of alliances, sale of goods, contracts, and principal-agent issues. The 
ways in which these factors are relevant for the process of globalisation are listed in 
Table 1. 
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Table 1: Business Relationships Involving Trust and Their Relevance to 
Globalisation 
1 Business cooperation 
and alliances 
Trust is important in fostering these relationships and this can 
result in cooperating enterprises being more competitive in 
the international markets or able to withstand increased 
competition in domestic markets from imports. 
2 Sale of goods Trust lowers the transaction costs of exchanges and expands 
the size of international markets. The more trustworthy 
business partners are, the lower is likely to be the cost of 
insuring against default and the lower is the cost of 
completing sales. 
3 Contracts involving 
international partners 
Similar observations apply as in the sale of goods case 
4 International direct 
investment 
Where this investment involves joint ventures, trust is 
important in influencing whether such joint ventures are 
undertaken and the amount of resources which partners 
commit to such undertakings. The greater the level of trust 
between investment partners; the more likely joint ventures 
are to form and the greater the amount of resources likely to 
be committed. 
5 Principal-agent issues In the case of multinational companies, managers of overseas 
subsidiaries may be difficult to monitor by central 
management in a company’s headquarters and this provides 
scope for ‘deviant’ behaviour by the former. Consequently, 
whether or not an overseas subsidiary is established or is 
sustained can depend on the trustworthiness of available 
managers for it. Improvement in communications and 
transport, however, make monitoring of overseas managers 
easier than in the past. 
 
6. Discussion 
The above considerations raise the question of what contributes to the development of 
trust and the maintenance of it. The knowledge which any potential parties to 
situations involving trust have of one another is important in judging the extent to 
which the parties are trustworthy. Experience obtained from previous business 
dealings with individuals or business entities appears to be widely used as a basis for 
developing sustained business cooperation (Adam, 2007; Adam and Tisdell, 2008). In 
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some cases, shared values with ethnic or religious groups may also play a role and 
often, family connections can be very important. 
However, penalties for breach of trust and threat power, which can be applied if there 
is a breach of trust, can play an important role in ensuring that agreements are fulfilled. 
The lower is the legal cost of obtaining damages for a non-fulfilment of an agreement, 
the higher the claim upheld by the court for damages and the more certain is the legal 
redress; the more likely are contracting parties to fulfil their agreements. Thus, low 
legal cost and certainty of the law are factors that reinforce trust. 
This can be illustrated by the prisoners’ dilemma type of problem shown in Table 2. 
Two parties, 1 and 2 enter into an agreement to respectively adopt strategy s11 and s21, 
or undertake actions corresponding to these. Each has an alternative strategy, s12 and 
s22 respectively which would involve breaking that agreement. The payoffs are shown 
in the body of the matrix in Table 2. If each party keeps to their agreement, each will 
gain 10 units of payoff. However, if one double-crosses and the other does not, the 
untrustworthy party gains 12 units of payoff and the trusting party is left with 4 units 
of payoff. The aggregate benefit of the parties is reduced as a result of this behaviour 
(from 20 units to 16) but the untrustworthy party benefits. However, the worst 
outcome occurs when both parties fails to keep to the agreement, that is the strategic 
combination (s12, s22) is adopted. Each party then only gains 5 units and their potential 
aggregate benefit is reduced from 20 units to 10 units. 
Table 2: A case in which parties to an agreement have an incentive to break it 
unless adequate external sanctions can be applied for non-compliance. 
 Strategies of 2 
 s21 s22
s11 (10,10) (4,12) 
Strategies of 1 
s12 (12,4) (5,5) 
 
If in the case illustrated by Table 2, an injured party to the contract is able to obtain 
damages from a party that fails to fulfil the agreement of 6 units with certainty plus 
legal costs, no party will have an incentive to break the agreement. There will be 
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greater trust in the fulfilment of the treatment. However, the lower the probability of 
obtaining damages of 6 units and the greater the uncertainty about recovery of the 
amount of legal costs, the lower would be the level of trust in fulfilment of the 
agreement. The law, therefore, can help to reinforce trust in an agreement being 
fulfilled. 
Nevertheless, there are some types of agreements for which there is no legal redress. 
Their fulfilment depends entirely on parties acting in complete good faith. Prisoners’ 
dilemma type situations in which no third (external) party (such as the state) can be 
called upon to penalize parties who fail to carry out agreements, rely completely on 
trust to ensure completion of the actions desired by parties involved in these situations 
(Tisdell, 1966). That is true, for example, in the case illustrated in Table 2. 
Improvements in the law internationally can help to contribute to the growth of 
economic globalization. Such improvements can include the harmonization of the 
laws of different nations, the simplification of laws and of legal procedures as well as 
increased precision in the application of laws. Furthermore, institutional developments 
that allow contracts to be specified in a more precise form can also assist in clarifying 
and enforcing contracts internationally. The International Standards Organization 
(ISO) has made (and continues to make) important contributions in this regard. Its 
classifications help to reduce uncertainty in international trading. 
7. Concluding Comments 
While artificial restrictions on trade and exchange limit the size of markets, the level 
of economic activity and welfare, the removal of such restrictions may only reduce 
these consequences to a limited extent if trust is lacking in relation to economic 
exchange and business agreements. If wealth maximization is an important goal for 
society, is for example Posner (1981,1985) claims it to be, it is therefore important for 
society to foster a culture in which reliability and trustworthiness are valued, and to 
back this up wherever possible with a supportive and economical legal system. It will 
also be in the interest of a nation or society to encourage other nations and societies 
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with which it has economic links to do likewise. The spread of such an ethos can 
increase the magnitude of economic globalisation and add to global wealth. 
In many societies, individuals who are trustworthy and conscientious are highly 
regarded. In this article, it has also been observed that if these qualities are widespread 
in a society, they are of substantial economic value because they foster the 
maximization of a society’s economic wealth. 
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